Supreme Court Decision on October 31, 2017, Case 2016du36956 | |||||
* Plaintiff, Respondent: Coaworld Co., Ltd.
* Defendant, Appellant: Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission * Defendant's Assistant Intervener: Korean Metal Workers' Union 1. Facts a. The Plaintiff was established on December 24, 2012, and operates in the automobile parts manufacturing industry with approximately 50 regular employees. The Plaintiff is an in house subcontractor of Hyundai BNG Steel Co., Ltd. Before the Plaintiff's establishment, Coamoltech Co., Ltd. was founded on December 17, 2002, and operated as an in-house subcontractor of Hyundai BNG Steel. However, Coamoltech's contract with Hyundai BNG Steel expired on December 31, 2012, and it no longer serves as an in house subcontractor. Upon its establishment, the Plaintiff hired 58 out of the 65 employees from Coamoltech. In addition to these two companies, Coajungmil Co., Ltd. also serves as an in house subcontractor for Hyundai BNG Steel and continues to do so. b. The Hyundai BNG Steel In-house Subcontract Branch, which is part of the participant's industrial union, currently includes some employees working at the Plaintiff's and Coajungmil's workplaces. Before the Plaintiff was established, the employees working at Coamoltech's workplace, while Coamoltech maintained its status as an in house subcontractor of Hyundai BNG Steel, were members of this branch. c. This branch was established on November 18, 2012, by the employees working at Coamoltech's workplace before the Plaintiff was established. After the establishment of this branch, on November 19, 2012, the participant, as the superior labor union, requested collective bargaining with Coamoltech in accordance with Article 142 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union Act and announced this request. At that time, there were no other labor unions at Coamoltech's workplace, so no other labor union besides the participant requested collective bargaining within seven days of the announcement. d. Subsequently, the Plaintiff was established on December 24, 2012, and hired most of the employees from Coamoltech who were members of the branch. As a result, the Plaintiff continued the collective bargaining that Coamoltech had been conducting with the participant. The Plaintiff and the participant held their first round of negotiations on January 4, 2013, and after more than ten rounds of negotiations, they concluded a collective agreement on March 21, 2013, with a validity period from March 21, 2013, to March 31, 2014. e. About three months before the expiration of the collective agreement, around December 2013, a new labor union named the "Coaworld Labor Union" was established among the employees working at the Plaintiff's workplace, separate from the existing branch. As the expiration date of the collective agreement approached, on January 10, 2014, the participant requested collective bargaining with the Plaintiff in accordance with Article 142 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union Act. Similarly, the Coaworld Labor Union also requested collective bargaining with the Plaintiff on January 14, 2014, under Article 144 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union Act. Consequently, the Plaintiff confirmed both the participant and the Coaworld Labor Union as the unions requesting bargaining according to Article 145 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union Act. Following the procedures outlined in Article 292, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the Trade Union Act and Articles 146 and 147 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union Act, the Coaworld Labor Union was confirmed as the bargaining representative union around February 12, 2014. Consequently, the Plaintiff conducted collective bargaining with the Coaworld Labor Union and concluded a new collective agreement on April 3, 2014, with a validity period of two years from the signing date. f. Around July 2014, the participant and a nonparty employee who belonged to the branch filed a claim with the Jeonnam Regional Labor Relations Commission for remedy from unfair labor practices. In this claim, the participant argued that they held the status of the bargaining representative union for two years from the effective date of the 2013 collective agreement. The participant claimed that the Plaintiff ignored this status and recognized the Coaworld Labor Union as the bargaining representative union through a new single bargaining channel procedure, leading to the 2014 collective agreement and rejecting the participant's collective bargaining request, which constituted an unfair labor practice. g. On September 1, 2014, the Jeonnam Regional Labor Relations Commission dismissed the relief application, stating that it was difficult to recognize that the Plaintiff had taken over Coamoltech's business or succeeded its employment. Therefore, the participant, having undergone the single bargaining channel procedure with Coamoltech, could not be seen as holding the status of the bargaining representative union in relation to the Plaintiff. The participant filed for reexamination with the National Labor Relations Commission. And the National Labor Relations Commission overturned the initial ruling, stating that "the Plaintiff had taken over Coamoltech's business and succeeded to Coamoltech's status in relation to the participant, thereby allowing the participant to retain the status of the bargaining representative union with respect to the Plaintiff." Consequently, the Plaintiff's refusal to accept the participant's collective bargaining request was recognized as an unfair labor practice. 2. Court Judgment a. According to Article 5, Article 29(1), and the main text of Article 292(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Trade Union Act'), and considering the purpose and intent of the single bargaining channel system which aims to establish an efficient and stable collective bargaining framework by effectively resolving issues such as antagonism and conflict between multiple labor unions or between labor unions and employers, reduced efficiency in collective bargaining, and increased costs when multiple labor unions exercise their independent bargaining rights and the detailed procedures for single bargaining channels stipulated in Article 292(2) to (8) of the Trade Union Act, and Articles 142 to 149 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Enforcement Decree'), as well as the period during which the status of the bargaining representative union is maintained as outlined in Article 1410 of the Enforcement Decree, it is understood that: the single bargaining channel system is designed with the expectation that, barring special circumstances, multiple labor unions will be confirmed as unions requesting bargaining, and among them, one union representing all the bargaining requesting unions will need to be selected. Furthermore, according to the provisions of the Trade Union Act, the representative of the bargaining representative union determined through the single bargaining channel procedure has the authority to conduct collective bargaining with the employer and conclude collective agreements on behalf of all bargaining requesting unions or their members (Article 29(2)). However, if there was no other labor union from the beginning to reflect the intentions of other unions, the concept of a bargaining representative union becomes meaningless and it becomes difficult to find any inherent significance otherwise. Ultimately, comprehensively considering the purpose and intent of the single bargaining channel system, its structure and related provisions, and the concept of the bargaining representative union, it is reasonable to interpret that a sole labor union within a business or workplace unit cannot acquire the status of a bargaining representative union, even if it formally follows the procedures stipulated by the Trade Union Act and its Enforcement Decree. b. The lower court, citing the reasons from the first instance judgment, determined that when the defendant's assistant intervenor (hereinafter referred to as the 'intervenor') conducted the single bargaining channel procedure and engaged in collective bargaining with the plaintiff, resulting in the 2013 collective agreement, the intervenor was the only labor union present at the plaintiff's workplace. Thus, the intervenor did not hold the status of the bargaining representative union and could not be guaranteed the period for maintaining the status of the bargaining representative union. Consequently, when the plaintiff subsequently engaged in a new single bargaining channel procedure and concluded the 2014 collective agreement with another labor union that was confirmed as the bargaining representative union, the refusal to accept the intervenor's collective bargaining request did not constitute an unfair labor practice in relation to the intervenor. Upon reviewing the reasons for the first instance judgment adopted by the lower court against the duly admitted evidence, this judgment aligns with the previously discussed legal principles. There is no error, as claimed by the grounds for appeal, in the understanding of the legal principles concerning the single bargaining channel procedure, the status of a single labor union and bargaining representative union (Article 292(1) of the Trade Union Act), and the refusal of collective bargaining constituting an unfair labor practice (Article 81(3) of the Trade Union Act). |
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Download : 대법 2016두36956.pdf | |||||
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